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Abstract 
Prior studies on tax avoidance have been emphasising on the individuals behaviour 
rather than corporations. In addition to this, the available studies on corporate tax 
avoidance, to date, have been focusing on the developed market while very little 
attention has been given to the developing countries. Thus, this study attempts to 
investigate the corporate tax avoidance behaviour in Malaysia, focusing on industry 
affiliations. Specifically, the objective of this study is to examine the importance of 
industry affiliations as possible contributions of corporate tax avoidance mechanism. 
This study documented the link between industry affiliations and corporate tax 
avoidance in an emerging market. This study tested the relationship by using a cross-
sectional-time series valuation using panel data analyses, which is Tobit estimations. 
The results confirmed the importance of industry differences in explaining corporate 
tax avoidance activity. As more data become available in the future, one could include 
tax avoidance study in non-listed companies. 




Tax avoidance refers to the use of legal loopholes and tax allowances to legitimately 
reduce the size of ones tax liability. This activity, which is also known as an aggressive 
tax planning often requires an intelligent application of expert knowledge to avoid tax. 
In relation to this, Lymer and Oats (2006, p.350) defined tax planning as an activity that 
involves strategic use of available tax concessions in order to minimise tax liability. 
In Malaysia, income tax revenue is a major contributor to the Malaysian government 
revenues. Since the implementation of Self-Assessment System (SAS) in 2001, tax 
compliance is an important issue to ensure that taxpayers pay their appropriate share of 
taxes. A tax system is one tool that a government can use to promote overall economic 
stability and growth. However, the tax system may itself create opportunities for 
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unintended behaviour. The behaviour exists as a consequence of tax loopholes in the 
tax system. One of the unintended behaviours is aggressively minimizing tax liabilities, 
which is a device of tax avoidance activity. Thus, there is a need to study this activity. 
The principal objective of this study is to explore the industry effect towards corporate 
tax avoidance activities. In Malaysia, different industries receive different tax 
treatments or incentives, thus, industrial affiliation might be a potential explanation of 
the tax planning or tax avoidance activities. Corporate tax planning is associated with 
tax avoidance, as it is resulted in paying less tax than otherwise required. Tax planning 
is a process of tax minimization, where there is no conscious wrongdoing, however, 
the taxpayers have employed legal methods or schemes for reducing their tax liability 
and this is allied to tax avoidance. This study would provide new evidence of industry 
effects on corporate tax avoidance activity. 
2.0 Malaysian corporate tax 
Similar to other countries such as the UK and the US, Malaysia has also been reducing 
its corporate tax rate gradually over the years, from 40 per cent in 1988 to the current 
rate of 25 per cent. The rationale behind this reduction, among others, are to help ease 
the tax burden of the private sector, attract foreign investors and provide incentives for 
companies to expand their activities. In tandem with that, a number of tax incentives 
have been introduced by the Malaysian government to promote foreign investments 
and priority industries, particularly for projects with capital-intensive high value 
added content and new and emerging technologies. These tax incentives are clearly 
spelt out in the Promotion of Investment Act 1986 (PIA) and the Income Tax Act, 
1967. For instance, the PIA offers tax incentives for investments in promoted products 
and activities in manufacturing, agriculture, tourism including hotels, research and 
development (R&D) and training. Likewise, companies with Multimedia Super 
Corridor (MSC) status would be able to enjoy special incentives, including tax holidays 
for a period of up to 10 years or Investment Tax Allowance (ITA) of 100 per cent and 
tax exemptions on the import of multimedia equipment. These incentives are intended 
to encourage the development of the MSCs and to ensure that there are sufficient 
knowledge-workers for the multimedia and information technology. This is important 
in order to accomplish a fully developed and industrialised country by the year 2020 as 
inspired by the Vision 2020. 
 3.0 Prior research 
 3.1 Theoretical background 
This study presents a principal-agent model, which is considered appropriate to analyse 
the corporate tax avoidance (Slemrod, 2004). The basic premise of this model is that 
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decisions about corporate tax avoidance are made by companies managers. The model 
also suggests that the managers (agent) decisions to get involved in corporate tax 
avoiding activity could be due to two motivations namely synergy and agency, or even 
hubris, the exaggerated pride. 
In a synergy-motivated tax planning, the managers are assumed to act in the interests 
of their shareholders in order to increase the firm value. If the tax planning activity is 
driven by this motive, the likelihood for that activity to create wealth for the shareholders 
would be high. 
Meanwhile, agency theory suggests that the interests of principals and agents may not 
necessarily coincide. The theory generally rests on the assumption that managers have 
an incentive to maximise their personal utility and may do so even to the detrimental 
of the shareholders. In this instance, managers may attempt to minimise tax to derive 
a private benefit, such as an increase in their prestige or career prospects. This is an 
indication of the opportunism and self-interest attributes of the managers, which have 
been addressed in the agency literature. In fact, Alchian and Demsetz (1972), Jensen 
and Meckling (1976) and Eisenhardt (1989) unanimously agreed that in the absence of 
either appropriate incentives or sufficient monitoring, agents will be able to exercise 
their discretion to the detrimental of principals. This is based on the argument that the 
owners may wish to maximise their profits, while their designated agents may have 
neither the interest nor the incentive to do so. 
Hubris results from the mistakes by managers in estimating the value of tax planning. 
Hubris emphasizes the role of managers and their personality traits. Under the hubris 
theory, tax planning may be initially viewed as deriving from the motivation to raise firm 
value and maximise shareholders wealth. The study of hubris which is widely used in 
the takeover literature has attracted scholars to understand the role of the neurotic and 
psychological disorders of top executives. The concept of hubris from the personality 
theory (for example, see Kets de Vries 1990 and 1991), provides a description of 
hubristic leaders as narcissistic personalities who desires for the reassurance and the 
applause of others. Kets de Vries (1991) noted that, with previous successes and from 
consistent public acclaim for successful achievements, hubristic leaders ended up 
believing that their achievements exceed those of their counterparts. Kroll, Toombs 
and Wright (2000) emphasized that hubristic leaders tend to listen only to people whose 
opinions are compatible with their own. Consequently, being too independent, hubristic 
leaders tend to make mistakes. 
This study proposes that in any tax avoidance activity, the elements of synergy, agency 
and hubris simultaneously exist and interact to determine the output of the activity. 
These theories are adopted to identify the economic motives that influence managers to 
make certain choices. Thus, this study attempts to provide additional evidence on the 
principal-agent model in the tax avoidance behavioural study. 
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3.2 Tax avoidance 
The activities of tax avoidance are non-evasive but referred to aggressive tax planning. 
Armstrong et al. (2012) studied the evidence of aggressive tax planning from the 
incentives given to the executive. They provide the evidence that managerial incentives 
influence tax planning choices. One step of the measurement of tax planning in their 
study is effective tax rate. Dyreng et al. (2008) measured the ability of companies to 
avoid tax in the long-run (10 years). They found that companies are able to successfully 
avoid large portions of the corporate income tax over continuous periods of time. 
The Effective Tax Rates (ETR) has been widely used to measure the tax burden of a 
company (for example, see Armstrong et al, 2012; Dyreng et al., 2008; Derashid and 
Zhang, 2003; Gupta and Newberry, 1997; Callihan, 1994; Manzon and Smith, 1994; 
Porcano, 1986; Spooner, 1986 and Zimmerman, 1983). Rego (2003) interpreted ETR 
as a measure of the effectiveness of tax planning. 
There is a range of alternative formulae which may be used to define and measure 
ETR. Callihan (1994) and Omer et al. (1991) raised the issue of different measures 
of the ETR. Several groups of ETR studies have measured ETR differently. For 
example, Zimmerman (1983) measured the effective tax rate as a ratio of income tax to 
operating income, where income tax represents the total income tax liability adjusted 
for changes in deferred taxes, and operating income is total sales minus costs of sales. 
Porcano (1986) measured effective tax rates as a ratio of current income tax to pre-tax 
book income adjusted by income or losses associated with minority interests and/or 
extraordinary items. Holland (1998), on the other hand, estimated effective tax rate by 
dividing a firm’s current corporation tax provision by its related level of income. 
Generally, ETR is calculated by using a simple formula of dividing tax liability by 
profit. However, the issues that have been the centre of attention are the determination 
of tax liability (as the numerator) and the profit (as the denominator). With regards to 
the numerator, that is, which taxes should be considered to represent the overall tax 
burden of a company, a few studies have used tax expenses and excluded deferred taxes 
(Omer et al., 1993; Kern and Morris, 1992), while others have chosen not to exclude 
deferred tax (Rego, 2003; Kim and Limpaphayom, 1998; Gupta and Newberry, 1997; 
and Porcano, 1986). These latter studies chose not to exclude deferred taxes because 
they believed that deferred taxes would control for earning management strategies. 
This argument is logical considering that income increases earnings management, 
increases both the numerator (deferred taxes) and the denominator (pre-tax income). 
Thus, the inclusion of deferred taxes in the numerator will not affect the overall results 
and the results will not be driven by earnings management. In addition, Clowery et 
al. (1986) argued that it is not easy to include the present value of deferred taxes as it 
cannot be accurately estimated. 
 
With regard to the denominator of ETR, that is, which income should be considered to 
represent the company’s profit, Zimmerman (1983), suggested the use of cash flow 
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(instead of operating income) to eliminate the effects of different accounting treatments 
of income. A number of studies (Phillips, 2003; Rego, 2003; Porcano, 1986) used pre-
tax income as the denominator. They claimed that ETR reflects a company’s effective 
tax planning. Hence this study uses pre-tax income as the denominator of ETR. 
The selection of the different measures of ETR is commonly associated with the 
purpose of the studies themselves. For example, Buijink et al. (1999) investigated 
the difference between ETR and the statutory tax rate (STR) across companies; 
Holland (1998), Callihan (1994), and Manzon and Smith (1994) concentrated on the 
tax burden of companies; Buijink et al. (2001) focused on corporate tax competition; 
and Rego (2003) examined corporate tax avoidance. The present study utilises the 
corporate tax avoidance study by Rego (2003) and measures ETRs as a proxy for 
corporate tax avoidance. Rego (2003) claimed that since ETRs compare the current 
tax liability generated by taxable income (to the tax authorities) with pre-tax income 
based on generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP), ETRs actually measure 
the proficiency of a corporation to reduce its current tax liability relative to its pre-tax 
accounting income. Thus they should reflect the tax planning and at the same time 
measure the tax avoidance of companies. 
According to Rego (2003), tax avoidance activities create book-tax differences, 
which are either temporary or permanent differences between a company’s financial 
accounting and taxable income. Thus, the numerator is based on taxable income and 
the denominator is based on financial accounting income to accommodate book-tax 
differences.
1
 In addition, Rego (2003) employed sensitivity analysis which excluded 
deferred taxes from the numerator of ETR and found that they did not affect the main 
results of his paper. Rego (2003) claimed that firms that avoided income taxes by 
reducing their income tax payable while maintaining their accounting income would 
have lower ETR, thus making ETR a reasonable measure of tax avoidance. 
The analysis of this study utilises the concept of effective tax rates (ETR) since it is 
considered the most appropriate tool to measure the distribution of a company s tax 
burden. This measurement was in line with Rego s proxy for tax avoidance that is also 
consistent with the studies of Mills et al. (1998) and Phillips (2003). ETR is measured 
as the ratio of current income tax expense to income before income tax. 
 
3.3 Profitability 
Manzon and Plesko (2002) suggested that profitable firms can make more efficient use 




1 According to Mills (1998), whose study was conducted using U.S. data, firms with greater book-tax 
differences have larger Internal Revenue Service (IRS) audit adjustment that is consistent with greater tax 
avoidance activities. 
2 Book-tax difference is the different between income reported to shareholders (annual report) and tax 
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Spooner (1986) contended that investment patterns and profitability affect ETR. 
Siegfried (1972) is one of the many ETR literature which argued that ETR can be 
used to measure effective tax planning, and hypothesized that firms which have greater 
resources would develop expertise in tax planning. 
Rego (2003) investigated whether economies of scale exist for tax planning, that is 
whether larger and more profitable multinational corporations avoid more taxes than 
other firms. He found that, corporations with greater pre-tax income have lower ETRs. 
The negative association between the firm size and ETR suggested that firms with 
greater pre-tax income avoid more income taxes than other firms. 
Profitability is measured by income before income tax and is predicted to have negative 
association with ETR. Rego (2003) documents that corporations with greater pretax 
income have lower ETR, as companies with greater pre-tax income have greater 
resources to engage in tax planning. Companies with high profits are likely to employ 
extensive tax planning to gain tax benefits. Thus a negative relationship between 
income before income tax and ETR is predicted. 
 
3.4 Industry effects 
 
Industry affiliation is a potential explanatory variable for tax avoidance as the 
avoidance activity may depend on the sensitivity of certain industries. In other words, 
different industries may receive different tax treatments/incentives and therefore their 
engagement in tax planning may differ too. For example, studies on U.S. firms by 
Rosenberg (1969) and Harberger (1959) indicated that the farming, textiles, petroleum, 
coal products and real estate sectors paid significantly lower income taxes than other 
sectors. Omer et al. (1993) found evidence of empirical differences in ETR in the 
pharmaceutical industry and the petroleum refining industry. Another U.S. study by 
McIntyre and Nguyen (2000) indicated that ETRs vary widely by industry, with oil 
companies enjoying the lowest ETR. 
Kim and Limpaphayom (1998) suggested that industrial effects might be a potential 
explanation for differences in ETR, and acknowledged the importance of sector 
effects in their article, but did not include them as explanatory variables. Derashid 
and Zhang (2003) examined the issues of industry effects on ETR in Malaysia. They 
found evidence that, manufacturing firms and hotels had significantly lower ETRs than 
any other public listed companies in Malaysia between 1990 and 1999. Derashid and 
Zhang (2003) classified industries into consumer, manufacturing, mining, finance, 
construction, trading, hotel and plantations, whereas this present study uses seven 
categories which are: basic material, industrial, consumer goods, health care, consumer 
services, utilities and technology in 2001 to 2005. The classification of these categories 
was based on industry sectors classified in the Thomson Analytic Database. This 
 
authorities (taxable income). 
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industry classification is different from Derashid and Zhang’s (2003) study which was 
based on the Bursa Malaysia classification. 
 4.0 Methodology 
 4.1 Sample and data collection method 
The full population of companies listed on the Bursa Malaysia (formerly known as 
the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange, KLSE
3
) from 2001 to 2005 was first reviewed for 
sample selection. The year 2001 was selected as the starting point as it coincides with 
the implementation of the self-assessment system for companies in Malaysia. The data 
were in the form of panel data. Selected companies were drawn from seven industries 
which are basic materials, industrial, consumer goods, health care, consumer services, 
utilities and technology. 
 
The data were collected from the annual report in the Thomson Analytic Database for 
2001 2005, resulting in 5,000 observations. Table 1 summarises the sample selection 
procedures. Banking and insurance companies were excluded because they are subject 
to different legislation from the other companies and the regulatory constraints faced 
by these companies are likely to affect their ETR differently from other companies 
(740 firm-years). These companies tend to be highly regulated and relatively ‘safe’ 
companies in Malaysia. Previous ETR studies (for example, see Rego, 2003; Gupta 
and Newberry, 1997; Manzon and Smith, 1994; Wilkie and Limberg, 1993; Shevlin 
and Porter, 1992; Zimmerman, 1983; Wilkie, 1988 and Stickney and McGee, 1982) 
omitted companies with losses or zero income. These companies would create negative 
values for ETR which was not susceptible of economic interpretation in this context. 
In addition, most of the loss-making companies in the data set were loss-making for 
the entire period of the study. Thus, to be consistent with prior studies, this study also 
omitted company-year observations with losses or zero income which resulted in 1,970 
firm-years. Firm-years with incomplete ETR data were also excluded (645 firm-years). 
One of the reasons for the incomplete data is the change of companies’ fiscal year - 
ends during the sampling period. The change of fiscal year-ends would create financial 
reporting gaps or reduced accounting periods. Thus, the exclusion of these companies 
was to ensure that the ETR calculation was not misleading. The final sample comprised 
1,645 firm-year observations as shown in Table 1. 
 
 
3 Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange (KLSE) has changed its name to Bursa Malaysia on 26th April 2004. 
Even though the period of study covers from 2001 to 2005, the name Bursa Malaysia will be used 
throughout the study. 
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Table 1 
Sample selection procedure 
Number of firm-years 2001 – 2005 5,000 
Less:  
Banking and insurance companies (740) 
Companies-years with loss or zero income (1,970) 
Companies-years with missing ETR data (645) 
Number of firm-years available for ETR analysis 1,645  
Table 2 shows industry classifications, as per the Thomson Analytic Database 
classification. However, the industrial classifications of fewer than 10 companies were 
omitted owing to the loss of degrees of freedom. Thus, the regression for industrial 
effects dropped two industries, namely oil and gas, and telecommunication. 
Table 2 
Industry classifications 
Industry Frequency Percent 
Oil and Gas 10 .6 
Basic Material 165 10 
Industrial 600 36.5 
Consumer Goods 555 33.7 
Health Care 45 2.7 
Consumer Services 130 7.9 
Telecommunication 10 .6 
Utilities 35 2.1 
Technology 95 5.8 
Total 1,645 100  
The test used Tobit estimation, which censored the dependent variable values of ETR 
by means of truncation at both sides of ETRs to remove the most extreme negative 
and positive observations and restrict the effect of potential bias. As ETRs could be 
explained as ratios, they are easily affected by outliers. To correct for such outliers, 
the truncated regression model was employed. As suggested by Buinjink et al. (2000), 
this filter was used to ensure that the most extreme observations were excluded from 
the analysis, without unnecessary loss of useful data. This estimation tended to reduce 
the influence of outlying observations, thus observations with either an ETR greater 
than double the statutory tax rate (56 per cent), or a negative/zero ETR were deleted. 
Therefore, only those companies with an ETR in the range between 0 per cent and 56 per 
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cent were considered. This would censor the data set to include a more representative 
and reliable range of corporate ETRs. This model censored at double value of STR 
was consistent with the model used by Buinjink et al. (2000). The filter only removed a 
small part of the sample and did not bias the mean upward and downward. 
The estimation of tax avoidance behaviour was for public listed companies in the 
Bursa Malaysia and these differed across industrial sectors. It examined the influence 
of industry effects on tax avoiding behaviour across companies. Different industries 
which received different tax treatments would lead to the different effective tax burdens. 
This test helped to assess whether the industry differences had an effect on tax avoiding 
behaviour. 
 5.0 Findings and discussion 
 5.1 Profitability 
Table 3 shows the whole result for tax avoidance model. However, the discussion only 
focuses on the profitability variable. 
Table 3 
Regression result for profitability 
Explanatory Variables Expected Sign Coefficient 
(Std Error) 
Constant  -3.0239* 
  (.3880) 
PC + .3215* 
  (.0939) 
Profitability - - .1695** 
  (.083 8) 
STDB - - 
LTDB - -.0011 
  (.0011) 
TDB - .0004 
  (.0003) 
STDM - - 
LTDM - - 
TDM - .0004 
  (.0009) 
DFA - .2011*** 
  (.1160) 
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Explanatory Variables Expected Sign Coefficient 
(Std Error) 
FA - -.0040*** 
(.0025) 
CAPINT - -.3193* 
(.0720) 
DPR + -.0064* 
(.0022) 
MO - -.0194*** 
(.0116) 
LR chi2(13) 65.54 
Prob > chi2 0.0000 
Pseudo R2 0.0188 
Number of observations 1012 
Left-Censored Observations 187 
Right-Censored Observations 19 
Uncensored Observations 806 
Note: 
*indicates statistical significance at the 1% level 
**indicates statistical significance at the 5% level 
***indicates statistical significance at the 10% level 
 
The estimated coefficient of profitability showed a significant negative sign for the 
regression. The negative relation between profitability and ETR indicated that companies 
with greater resources had more incentives and ability to engage in tax planning. This 
finding was consistent with those reported by Rego (2003) and Manzon and Plesko 
(2002). Rego (2003) documented that corporations with greater pre-tax income had a 
lower ETR and claimed that firms with greater pre-tax income avoided more income 
tax than companies with lower pre-tax income. Manzon and Plesko (2002) stated that 
profitable companies had a lower ETR as they were able to use tax deduction, credits, 
and exemptions with greater efficiency than less profitable companies. 
5.2 Industry effect 
Table 4 shows whether statistically significant relationships exist between tax avoiding 
activity and the profitability variable in each industry. The profitability variable had the 
expected negative sign and was significant in basic material, industrial and consumer 
services. However, the variable was significant with different direction than expected 
in the technology regression. 
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Table 4 
Regression results of tax avoidance activity on industry differences 
Industry Category Profitability No of Observation 
Basic Material -1.4954* 82 
 (.3908)  
Industrial -.8292* 369 
 (.1869)  
Consumer Goods -.0404 266 
 (.2512)  
Health Care .2513 19 
 (3.8894)  
Consumer Services -.7487*** 80 
 (.43 76)  
Utilities .5280 33 
 (.3619)  
Technology 4.6213* 27 
 (1.0859)  
Note: 
*indicates statistical significance at the 1% level 
**indicates statistical significance at the 5% level 
***indicates statistical significance at the 10% level  
In general, the four industries showing the strongest correlation between profitability 
and tax avoidance activity were basic materials, industrial, consumer services and 
technology, whereas the other industries, consumer goods, health care and utilities 
showed weaker correlation. The results confirmed the importance of the industry effect 
in the relationship between profitability and tax avoiding activity. 
Table 4 shows that basic material, industrial and consumer services sectors showed the 
significant level of lower ETRs compared with other sectors. Particularly, companies 
with higher profitability in basic material, industrial and consumer services sector, paid 
significantly less tax than any other industries. It is not surprising as the industrial 
sector
4
 was offered various tax benefits in order to promote both economic and social 
goals, including enhancing efficiency or competitiveness, fostering high-technology, 
protecting domestic products, increasing exports and widening job opportunities. 
Alavi (1996) indicated that Malaysia has a long standing industrial policy to promote 
companies in the manufacturing sectors. The Malaysian government provides various 
tax incentives to stimulate and support such companies. Several incentives have been 
provided, including incentives to strategic industries, incentives to strengthen industrial 
 
4 Both basic material sector and industrial sector are considered as manufacturing or industrial sector. 
Basic material mainly focus on manufacturing local resources such as quarrying and mining, while the 
industrial sector engages in manufacturing activities other than basic material sector. 
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links, incentives for industrialized building systems and incentives for outsourcing 
manufacturing activities. The incentives given include pioneer status, investment tax 
allowance, reinvestment allowance and accelerated capital allowances.  
The regression analysis confirmed that higher profitable companies in both basic material 
and industrial sectors, paid less tax. This result supported the hypothesis that the more 
profitable companies would have more resources to engage in effective tax planning. 
These findings were consistent with those reported by Rego (2003) and Manzon and 
Plesko (2002). This result suggests that the tax incentives for the industrial sector in 
Malaysia (which provides higher capital intensity companies with an advantage from 
accelerated capital allowances under the Promotion of Investment Act (1986)), have 
resulted in lower ETRs. 
As for basic material, industrial sectors and consumer services sector also recorded 
similar findings, with regard to higher profitable companies. Regression results relating 
to the consumer goods sector revealed that profitability had negative relationship with 
ETR. This finding could probably be due to the basic principle of business activities for 
consumer goods that is to meet the basic needs of the nation. The results confirmed that 
this sector undertook tax avoidance activities but not aggressive or significant. 
Results from the technology sector had a significant influence  on tax avoiding 
activity but with a different direction than expected. The technology sector showed 
that more profitable companies had a positive influence on ETR. In other words, in 
the technology sectors, more profitable companies paid more effective tax than less 
profitable companies. The technology sector is mainly based on developing and 
providing technology and technical support to the nation. This sector is important as it 
carries out the challenges to fulfill Vision 2020. The development of technology plays a 
crucial role in the governments plans. The Malaysian government focuses on national 
science and technology to sustain economic development and to improve quality of life 
and national security in the 21
st
 century. One of the policy goals of Vision 2020 is that 
science and technology are central in building a more innovative and vibrant economy. 
Thus, one explanation of the significant positive relation between profitability and ETR 
in this sector may be that this sector is important and under the supervision of the 
government and thus unable to engage in more aggressive tax planning. The results 
in the health care and utilities category indicated that profitable companies have a 
positive influence on ETR. Even though the result showed contradictory direction, but 
it was not a surprise considering both sectors were important to the nation. The utilities 
sector supplies basic needs to the nation (water supply, waste management, gas power 
generation, construction, environmental services and trading) while pharmaceutical 
sector is responsible to sustain nations health. As for consumer goods sector, both health 
care and utilities sectors are also important and under the government supervision, thus 
unable them to engage in the aggressive tax planning. 
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The results of this study are incomparable with Derashid and Zhang (2003) as this 
study grouped companies differently from their study. This study classified companies 
into seven industries: basic material, industrial, consumer goods, health care, consumer 
services, utilities and technology, which utilise the data from the Thomson Analytic 
Database. However, Derashid and Zhang (2003) classified companies into consumer, 
manufacturing, mining, finance, construction, trading, hotel and plantations, where the 
data are based on the Bursa Malaysia classification. Interestingly, their study also found 
evidence that some of the industries, that is manufacturing and hotels, paid significantly 
less ETRs than other industries. 
 
 
6.0 Conclusion and future recommendation 
Tax collection generates large amounts of revenue and is a vital source of income for 
government to promote overall economic stability and growth. Since Malaysia has 
implemented the self-assessment system for companies since 2001, it is important to 
ensure high compliance by taxpayers. The aim of this study is to examine the relationship 
between different sectors and tax avoiding activity, resulting in lower effective tax rate 
(ETRs). 
The results reported that companies across different industries do have significantly 
different characteristics and levels of tax avoiding activity. It shows that companies 
which paid less tax in Malaysia are those in the basic material, industrial, consumer 
goods and consumer services. 
The results confirmed the importance of industry differences in explaining the corporate 
tax burden. The evidence showed that companies across different industries do have 
significantly different levels of tax avoiding activity. Four sectors, namely basic 
material, industrial, consumer services and technology demonstrated a high correlation 
between profitability and tax avoidance activity. The evidence, however, is not always 
consistent with predicted direction across industries, particularly for the technology 
sector. 
In the technology sector, it appears that companies with higher income would have a 
higher ETR than other companies. Thus, not all companies with higher income would 
pay less tax, especially for the companies under the government supervision.  
This study bridge the research gaps with significant contributions both (1) theoretically 
and (2) practically. (1) Most research on corporate tax avoidance has been conducted in 
the US, the UK and Australia, and very few to the authors knowledge to be carried out 
in an emerging market. This study investigates corporate tax avoidance in Malaysia, 
thus adding to the corporate tax avoidance literature by examining an emerging market. 
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Clowery, G., Outslay, E. & Wheeler, J. (1986). The debate on computing 
corporate  
effective tax rates - An accounting view, Tax Notes, 30, 991-997. 
(2) This study would provide the tax authorities the valuable information regarding tax 
avoiding activity which will be an essential factor to assist them to develop a fairer tax 
system. Currently, modern businesses have become increasingly large and complex, 
and with more complex businesses, the loopholes in the tax system have expanded. 
Maybe, it is the right time to close some of these loopholes and protect the tax system 
base. It is hoped that this study would be able, partially, to assist the tax autho rities 
to develop tax reforms to reduce the opportunities for unintended tax avoidance. The 
outcome from the reform and the closing of the loopholes may be able to significantly 
improve the integrity of the Malaysian tax system. 
In sum, there is a recommendation for future research.. This study does not examine 
the association between corporate tax avoidance and non-listed companies in Malaysia. 
In the future, as more data becomes available, one could include tax avoidance in non- 
listed companies. 
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